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Abstract. President SBY’s statement that Indonesia is 
“a country where democracy, Islam and modernity go 
hand in hand” has underpinned new identity in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy as a Moderate Islam country. 
Despite often claim to be the world’s largest community 
of Muslim, this is the first time Islam in terms of 
moderate, entered in glossary of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy as formative factor. While in preivious era Islam 
was insignificant and played less substantial role in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, this paper seeks to scrutinise 
why is the moderate Islam openly articulated as part of 
Indonesia’s national identity? What are the purposes of 
the new foreign policy project in regard to the domestic 
tension at home and in relations with other Islamic 
countries and the rest of the world? This paper argues 
that the democratic moderate Islam identity is important 
in two ways. First, it is a part of the struggle to 
mainstreaming the moderate view in the continuing 
“intra-clash” among the radical and moderate Islam in 
Indonesia. Secondly, the new identity is put in place to 
aspire bigger role if not a leadership in international 
affairs by selling the model of democracy-moderate 
Islam nexus. The efficacy of this new identity, however 
will depend on the ability to manage the tension and 
conflict at home and abroad without fall into blinded 
coreligionist solidarity interest. 
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Introduction 
Among recent changes in Indonesian foreign policy that 
attract considerable attention is the declaration of Indonesia’s 
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new identity as a democracy and moderate Islam country. It is 
under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who won first 
direct presidential election in 2004, the new identity has begun. 
In his first foreign policy speech Yudhoyono introduced his 
metaphor “navigating a turbulent ocean” to describe the 
challenges facing Indonesian foreign policy. He also underlined 
the importance of Indonesia’s international identity as “a 
country where democracy, Islam and modernity go hand in 
hand”. The President’s speech becomes the first underpinning 
to transform Indonesia’s new national identity as well as forging 
international image.  
In fact, although often claim to be the world’s largest 
community of Muslim (87% of 237.6 million population)1 this 
is the first time Islam in terms of moderate, entered in glossary 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy as formative factor. In the 
previous era the role of Islam was insignificant and never 
played a substantial role in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Leo 
Suryadinata for example found that the fear of Islamic 
fundamentalism in domestic politics become the major reason 
for Indonesia to dwell in Islamic identity. Aspired to be the 
leader of the Non-Alignment Movement separated Indonesia 
from the Islamic world.2 In a similar vein, Banyu Perwita 
showed that Islam under Suharto, instead of become the crucial 
societal input in foreign policy making, has been neglected and 
manipulated as justifier in managing domestic politics.  
Rizal Sukma, a prominent Indonesian scholar and heads 
the international relations committee of Muhammadiyah, the 
second largest Indonesia’s Muslim social organisation, remarks 
that this new identity is becoming a significant breakthrough, a 
middle way of the dilemma of dual identity in Indonesia’s 
																																								 																				
1Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia (Indonesia’s Statistic Bureau), 
http://www.bps.go.id/aboutus.php?tabel=1&id_subyek=12, downloaded 10 may 
2011. 
2 Leo Suryadinata, ‘Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy; Indonesia, the Middle 
East and Bosnia’, Asian Survey, vol. XXXV, no. 3, March 1995. 
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foreign policy.3  The intention to project moderate Islam as new 
international image also can be seen as an asset in moderating 
tone between the Muslim countries and the rest of the world. 
Similarly, another Indonesian well-known scholar, Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar argues that Indonesia will provide an alternative 
model of a modern Islamic society and play important role in 
mediating international conflicts that involving Muslim interest 
and Islamic symbols.4 
The ongoing new identity projected by the Yudhoyono’s 
government reflects the dynamic change in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. This new development directly related to the domestic 
politics constellation and the changing of international 
environment such as September 11 and US’s sponsored war on 
terror. It is important to note that Islam politics in Indonesia is 
far from being coherent and monolithic form. There always 
competitions and contests in interpreting religious symbols, 
defining state’s institutions and perception towards 
international affairs among diverse political Islam groups in 
Indonesia. 
Since Islam becomes important social and political forces, 
it is of the interest of this essay to scrutinise why is the 
moderate Islam openly articulated as part of Indonesia’s 
national identity? What are the purposes of the new foreign 
																																								 																				
3 Dilemma of dual identity is a situation in which the majority of Indonesia’s 
population is Muslim and Islam has been serving as a source of norms and values in 
majority’s life. On the other hand Indonesia also featured by ethnic, culture and 
religious plurality. The state obliged to compromise the aspiration of the Muslims as 
majority and other religious minority. Since independence the ambiguity identity of 
Indonesia captured in a statement that “Indonesia is not a theocratic state neither a 
secular state, but somewhere between the two”.  See Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian 
Foreign Policy, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003. Also see Rizal Sukma, ‘Islam and 
Foreign Policy in Indonesia: Internal Weakness and the Dilemma of Dual Identity’, 
the Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, no. 11, September 2009. Also see, Rizal 
Sukma, ‘Political Change, Foreign Policy and Parliamentary Diplomacy’, speech 
delivered at 3rd annual CDI Indonesia-Australia Parliamentary Committee Forum, 
Jakarta 3 July 2008. 
4 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia’, 
Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, vol. 3, 2010. 
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policy project in regard to the domestic tension at home and in 
relations with other Islamic countries and the rest of the world? 
This essay argues that the democratic moderate Islam identity is 
a part of the struggle to mainstreaming the moderate view in 
the continuing “intra-clash” among the radical and moderate 
Islam in Indonesia. Moreover, the new identity is put in place to 
aspire bigger role if not a leadership in international affairs by 
selling the model of democracy-moderate Islam nexus. Yet, this 
kind of political leverage to gain a formidable international 
stature depends on the ability to manage the tension and 
conflict at home and abroad without fall into blinded 
coreligionist solidarity interest. 
 
The Struggle for Moderate Islam 
It is widely claimed that Indonesian Islam, in general, is a 
moderate and accommodative in compare to a rigid Middle 
Eastern Islam. Indonesia Islam also has a certain distinction in 
many ways compatible with plurality, democracy, modernity.5 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to define the Islamic community and 
Islamic interest since it is not a single-unitary political entity. 
Islam in Indonesia has been dispersed into dichotomous 
communities based on ideological line, such as modernists or 
traditionalist and radicals or moderates. The questions that arise 
against this backdrop are how moderate is Islam in Indonesia? 
Under what circumstances have the moderate embodied the 
identity of Indonesian Islam polity? 
The idea of moderate Islam becomes a popular public 
discourse after the rise of radical Islam and terrorist group 
during the last decade. The definition of moderate, however, is 
still being debated relating to the characteristic of who deserves 
to be the moderate. It is commonly acknowledged that 
																																								 																				
5 For example, see Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamic in 
Global Context, ICIP, Equinox, The Asia Foundation, Jakarta-Singapore, 2006. See 
also Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000. 
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moderate Islam is characterised by tolerant, modern, 
progressive, pro-democratic, close to secular and anti-violence 
(anti-Jihad) tenets in religion practises as well as social and 
political life.6 Those who are not practising any of the attributes, 
then simply categorised as radical or fundamental. Ed Hussain, 
however, contend that the binary split between moderate and 
radical in some ways insinuates the moderate is not the true 
Islam, while at the same time the radicals will easily claims as 
the genuine Muslims. Rather than moderate, according to 
Hussain, the right term is the “normal”.7  Similarly, John L. 
Esposito warns that the definition of the moderate Islam would 
depend on the political-religious affiliation of somebody who 
makes judgement. Just like other religions, Islam consists of not 
only the progressive, the modernist and the liberal, but also the 
conservative and the traditionalist. Thus, what the so-called 
moderate Islam is the majority of the Muslims who work inside 
the society and reject the use of violence, terrorism and other 
extreme religious means.8 
The identity of Indonesian Islam is hardly separated from 
the relationship between Islam and the state or Islam and 
politics. It is forged in the long historical journey of 
competition to influence the political, social, cultural and 
economic life of the society. Indeed, as Clifford Geertz 
suggested, the political Islam in Indonesia should be 
understood in terms of conflict between the Santri (devout 
Muslim), Abangan (nominal Muslim) and Priyayi (elites) to 
																																								 																				
6 See for example, Ariel Cohen, ‘Power or Ideology: What the Islamist 
Choose will Determine Their Future’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol. 22, 
no. 3, 2005, pp. 1-5. 
7 Ed Hussain, ‘Don’t Call Me Moderate, Call me Normal’, The Wall Street 
Journal, 1 September 2010. 
8 John L. Esposito, ‘ Moderate Muslims: A Mainstream of Modernist, 
Islamist, Conservatives and Traditionalist’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, no. 
22, vol. 3, 2005, pp. 11-13. 
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become politically dominant.9 Islamic organisations have been 
founded in the early of 20th century. The two most important 
Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah formed in 1912 as a 
reformist-modernist Islamic organisation, while Nahdatul 
Ulama established in 1926 as a conservative response to it. 
Since the early of independence, the fundamental issue for 
Indonesia as a plural country with Islam as a predominant 
religion has been how to put Islam in the right position of the 
state’s structure. Pancasila10 (five foundations), however, was 
chosen to become the fundamental foundation of the state as a 
compromise between the nationalist who support the identity 
of the newborn state should not be defined in terms of any 
religion and Islamist groups who demand a formal Islamic form 
of the state. The identity of the state perceives as lies 
somewhere between theocracy and secularism. This ambiguous 
identity becomes the main departure of the ongoing debate on 
the relation between Islam and the state that persist until now.11 
During the Suharto era political Islam was managed 
cautiously controlled and marginalised. Although Islamic 
groups were close alliance in the struggle of power to crush the 
Communist Party, in the subsequent step to consolidate the 
New Order regime political Islam was undermined ideologically 
and institutionally. All Islamic parties that flourished during the 
early phase of independence era were forced to merge into 
single party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United 
																																								 																				
9 See Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, The University of Chicago Press, 
1960. 
10 Pancasila comprises a five fundamental principles within which the state 
should be based on; belief in one God, humanism, nationalism, consultation and 
consensus and social welfare. 
11 In the early version of the preamble of Indonesia’s constitution that 
known as Jakarta Charter, there was a statement that espouse the obligation of the 
Islam follower to carry out the sharia. In the short time before proclamation of 
independence the clause was removed from the preamble and the body of the 
constitution. It is why among the Islamic leaders felt that they were being betrayed. 
The most important party which supported the Jakarta Charter was Masyumi party. 
For detail see, Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 18-20. 
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Development Party)12 and to accept the Pancasila as the sole 
official ideology instead of Islam. The de-politicising of political 
Islam was mostly caused by the potency of the large Islamic 
society as the challenger of the army who backed up the New 
Order regime.  
In the late of 1980s Indonesia saw a revival of Islam as an 
important social force. This had much to do with the changing 
of Indonesian society such as the growth of urban population, 
the development of middle classes and the dramatic rise of 
education level. The demographic changing was also 
accompanied by the flourish of new educated Islamic leaders 
that brought a sense of Islamic vision with Indonesian 
expression rather than identified themselves with transnational 
Islam movement. Among other important leaders were 
Abdurrahman Wahid of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Amien Rais of 
Muhammadiyah and Nurcholis Madjid a former leader of Muslim 
Student Association and Liberal Islamic leader (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam, HMI).  The result was that the ultimate stream 
in Indonesia’s Islam resurgence was moderate socially and 
politically, not radical or conservative.  
The Suharto regime responded the emergence of Islamic 
middle class by changing its policy from marginalisation to 
accommodation and tried to re-build political coalition with 
Islam. It is important to note that the shift towards 
accommodation was related to Suharto’s need to build a new 
political coalition due to the declining support from the 
military.13 At first Suharto tried to co-opt the moderate Muslim 
leaders among two important social-religious groups, the NU 
and the Muhammadiyah. In the next step, the new relationship 
																																								 																				
12 Among other parties that have been forced to merge were PSII (Partai 
Syarikat Islam Indonesia), NU Party, PERTI, and Parmusi party. 
13 The military began to criticise Suharto when Suharto swung his alliance 
closer towards the politico-business groups. The military also criticised the expansion 
of Soeharto’s children business. See, Richard Robison & Vedi R Hadis, Reorganising 
Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of Markets, Routledge, London, 2004 
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between Islam and the New Order regime mounted in the 
establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) in 
December 1990 led by B.J. Habibie.14 Not least, Suharto began 
to promote his personal piety by doing pilgrimages to Mecca. 
The establishment of ICMI raised controversies and 
debates. It was seen differently by elements of Indonesian 
society. For the Christian minority, the ICMI perceived as a 
new attempts to turn Indonesia back to Islamic state, while 
other Muslim groups took ICMI as political tool of Suharto in 
the struggle of power among New Order regime proponents.15 
It was not surprised, some Islamic group mainly Nahdatul 
Ulama and some elements of the military strongly criticised the 
creation of ICMI. For Abdurrahman Wahid of NU, the ICMI 
was controlled by the militants and the fundamentalist, while 
the military around the nationalist-secular perceived it a 
potential threat for stability and national unity.16 In the middle 
of 1990’s there was friction among ICMI leadership, flamed by 
the introduction of “succession” discourse brought by Amien 
Rais, the head of expert council of ICMI that also the leader of 
Muhammadiyah. 
																																								 																				
14 ICMI played an important role in the expansion of Islamic tendency policy 
such as the introduction of Islamic Court, the Compilation of Islamic law, Islamic 
Sharia banks and the lifting of prohibition against wearing veils in public school. 
Among the leaders of ICMI was appointed to hold high rank offices such as 
ministerial and other strategic position. ICMI also established a think tank, the 
Centre of Information and Development Studies, as well as the Republika newspaper. 
In short, with ICMI as a locomotive Islam was becoming more assertive in the 
economic and political sphere. See, AA. Banyu Perwita, ‘Islam “Symbolic Politics”, 
Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy’, Centro Argentino de Estudios 
Internacionales, 1999, www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/asia/04.pdf, downloaded 5 May 
2010. 
15 William Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn: a Political Explanation’, Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 55, no. 3, 1996. 
16 For example the military initiated by Gen. Edy Sudrajat established the 
Intellectual’s Association for the Advancement of Pancasila ( Persatuan Cendekiawan 
Pembangunan Pancasila, PCPP) AA. Banyu Perwita, ‘Islam “Symbolic Politics”, 
Democratization and Indonesian Foreign Policy’, p. 12-13. 
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When the Muslim leadership among moderate 
mainstream proved uncooperative, in the period between 1994 
and 1998, Suharto began his courtship to ultraconservative 
Islam mainly towards two groups, the Indonesian Council for 
Islamic Predication (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII)17 and 
the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World 
(Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam, KISDI). 
The two groups slow but sure became the embryo of the “neo-
fundamentalism” in Indonesia’s Muslim.18 The turn to political 
Islam affected the struggle for power in the ruling party, 
Golkar, between the nationalist-Christian-Muslim nominal 
camps versus the “green” wing around the military and the 
party, mounted in the triumph of pro-Habibie forces in Golkar 
at the congress on July 1998. Many of the nationalist-secular 
wings, after the defeat, left Golkar. The collaboration between 
the conservative groups and Islamist wing of the armed forces 
used propaganda using anti-Chinese, anti-Christian, and anti-US 
and Zionism as the enemy against Indonesia and Islam. This 
realignment of Suharto, the Islamist wing of the military and 
the fundamental Islam groups, however failed to defend 
Suharto position and he forced to step down in May 1998, but 
still continued under the Habibie as auxiliaries of the police and 
army. 
Thus, the dynamic of Suharto political control towards 
Islam politics has produced two different strands of Indonesian 
political Islam culture that has a profound implication to 
political Islam in the democratisation era. First, the largest 
group, led by many educated Muslims that develop a more 
open, tolerant and pluralistic approach regarding the 
																																								 																				
17 DDII founded in 1967 as the evolution of Masyumi Party (Islamic Party in 
Sukarno era which support the Jakarta Charter). While adopted the non-cooperation 
with the government, the senior leadership of Masyumi worked for the religious 
predication program. The DDII maintain its position to create conservative Islamic 
constituency.  
18 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics’, 
American Anthropologist, vol. 104, no. 3, 2002, pp. 756-757. 
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relationship between state and Islam. This moderate-pluralist 
camp emphasises a more substantive discourse of Islam rather 
than the symbolic-formal necessity to establish an Islamic state 
and a sharia law. The main pillar of the moderate group revolves 
around the two largest mass Islam organisations, Nahdatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Hefner identifies it as the civil-
pluralist Islam group that seek to create a rapprochement 
between Western ideas of equality, freedom and democracy 
within modern Muslim ideals.19  
In addition, there are also small groups, firstly nurtured 
by the regime that pursues a more formal-legalistic approach 
toward the establishment of Islamic state, or at least a sharia 
law. This view revolves around the Islamist parties20 and the 
neo-fundamental Muslim paramilitary groups such as Front 
Pembela Islam (Islamic Defence Front, FPI), Forum Komunikasi 
Ahlusunah Wal Jamaah/ Laskar Jihad (Communication Forum of 
the Follower of the Sunnah and The Community of Prophet/ 
Jihad Militia, FKAWJ/ LJ) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(Indonesian Mujahidin Council/ MMI), Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimin (JAMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and other 
smaller groups. It is clear that there has been little consensus 
among the two camps on what is Islam would takes form in 
Indonesia. 
The 1999 election, just like in the early independence era, 
once again became the first critical competition in the 
democratic era between the nationalist-secular parties and the 
Islamist parties. The election result showed only 13 percent 
																																								 																				
19 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 
20 Among other important Islamic parties are, PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan/ United Development Party), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/ National 
Awakening Party), PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/ Justice and Welfare Party), PAN 
(Partai Amanat Nasional/ National Mandate Party) and PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, the 
Crescent Moon and Star Party). PKB and PAN often disregard as Islamist party, 
although PKB mass base is NU and PAN mass base is Muhammadiyah. The two 
parties are moderate-pluralist Islamic parties since the membership of the party is 
open wide for other religious affiliation. 
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votes for overall Islamic parties compare to 76 percent for 
nationalist-secular-pluralist parties. Nevertheless, the radical 
Muslim groups, in the first five years of democratisation era, 
had vast public leverage compare to their actual number in the 
society. 21 At the same time the moderate and pro democratic 
Islam seemed to be weak and segmented in the face of the 
fundamentalists. This had much to do with the legacy of 
Suharto era that left fierce political struggle between the old 
guard and the reformist. There are at least three cases that 
highlight the growing out of control the radical Muslims 
groups. First, the case of communal conflict in Ambon showed 
how the radical Muslim groups openly defied the government 
authority to handle the communal conflict.22 Second, the 
reaction of the radical Muslim groups to the case of September 
11, the war on terror and US invasion to Afghanistan clearly 
depicted their influence to Indonesia’s domestic politics. 
Following the US attacked Afghanistan; the Jihad Militia (LJ) 
and Islamic Defenders front (FPI) urged their follower 
sweeping the hotels and tourist centres that targeted to the 
Western visitors as a way to show their solidarity to Muslim 
world.  
On the other hand, the Megawati government seemed 
wary to join in the US led War on Terror. More ironically, the 
Vice President Hamzah Haz (from PPP party) made a 
statement that the terrorist attack to the WTC is to clean 
America’s sins. Haz also refuse to acknowledge that Indonesia 
																																								 																				
21 In the 1999 election only three Islamic parties won significant percentage; 
the PPP, 11 percent, the PBB, 2% and the PK (the former name of PKS), 1 %. See 
Saiful Mujani and William R. Liddle, ‘Politics, Islam and Public Opinion’, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 15, no. 1, 2004 
22 For the radical groups, at least the Jihad Militia, communal conflict in 
Ambon clearly a conflict between Christian and Muslim. After several 
demonstrations and propagandas, the Jihad Militia led by Jafar Umar Thalib 
announced plans to send more than 2,000 jihad fighters to battle against the 
Christian in Ambon. The old guard elite supported the Jafar’s campaign in Ambon 
with the flow of fund and arms to destabilise the new democratic government. See, 
Robert W. Hefner, ‘Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics’, p. 760. 
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might become the safe haven of the terrorist group such as 
Jemaah Islamiyah. One argument behind the half-hearted 
Indonesia’s support on the war on terror was that the 
government tried to contain of the increase of domestic 
support towards those radical groups as well as to safe their 
seats among the Islamic constituent.23 The government 
position, then changed after the October 2002 Bali bombing, 
followed by serial bombing in 2003-2009, including the two 
times of JW Marriot hotel and Australian Embassy in Jakarta. 
The government started openly acknowledge the presence of 
the radical and militant groups and perceive it as serious source 
of threats. 
Along with the democratic consolidation process, the 
secular-moderate Islam political parties now dominate the 
Indonesian politics. It is proven by the result of parliamentary 
election in 2004 and 2009 in which the total vote for secular 
parties is 65% in 2004 and 70% in 2009 compare to total vote 
to Islamist parties which is 15% in 2004 and 13% in 2009.24 The 
explanation towards secularisation of Indonesian politics for 
some parts is due to the changing behaviour of the voters 
strongly lean towards a more moderate tone of Islamic values.25 
Moreover, the later election showed transformation of Islamist 
parties towards a “normalisation of Islamist party politics”.26 
The transformation is displayed by the changing appearance of 
Islamist parties (particularly PKS and PPP) to become more 
similar to other secular parties in terms of campaign messages 
and inclusive political strategies in order to seek broader 
																																								 																				
23 Azumardi Azra, ‘Challenge of Political Islam to Megawati’, The Jakarta Post, 
21 November 2001. 
24 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, ‘Muslim Indonesia's Secular 
Democracy’, Asian Survey, vol. XLIX, No.4, 2009. 
25 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, ‘Muslim Indonesia's Secular 
Democracy’, pp. 588-589. 
26 Thomas B. Pepinsky, Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, ‘Indonesian 
Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam’, paper presented at the 2010 
Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Philadelphia. 
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political support. In the same tone, Amy L. Freedman argues 
that, democracy in Indonesia so far has a moderating influence 
on many Islamic groups.27  
It does not mean that the contest between the moderate 
and the radical is resolved. Both are groups still struggling to 
win the heart and mind of the society. Although it is clear that 
the moderate groups outnumbers the radical groups, the later 
still operated in the fringes of the society to influence the nature 
of the debate over the role of the religion and politics and gain 
support from the conservative Islamic groups. The recent surge 
of Sharia law in many provincial and district administrations in 
clearly indicates that the conservative-radical influences cannot 
be discounted. They also still have strong sway to the 
government over the case of Ahmadiyah and other inter-
religion violence. 
The explanation above indicates that the contestation 
among different groups, defined as moderate and radical-
conservative, is still remaining. It has become part of “normal” 
politics in Indonesia, while the answer may need a long journey 
of dialectic process. To a certain degree, it is not overstate to 
define Islam Indonesia as moderate. The announcement of 
moderate Islam as Indonesian identity, therefore, can be 
understood as a constructive approach to mainstreaming the 
moderate Islam view in shaping the institutions, national 
interest and Indonesia’s action in international affairs.  The fact 
that there is still vigorous debate over the relation between the 
religion and the state may indicate that the moderate Islam is 
still being absorb into the polity. 
Moderate Islam in Foreign Policy; More Global Role 
Aspiration than Co-Religious Solidarity? 
The recent global terrorism phenomenon which often 
associated with radical Muslims of Al Qaeda network affects 
																																								 																				
27 Amy L. Freedman, ‘Political Viability, Contestation and Power: Islam and 
Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Politics and Religion, vol. 2, 2009. 
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the discourse of moderate Islam. Amidst the resurgence of 
radical-extreme Islam, the idea of “the fundamental-militant 
Islam is the problems and the moderate is the solution” 
accepted throughout the globe.28 Along with the Western 
government policy to encourage and empower the moderate, 
many Islamic groups and countries identified themselves with 
the moderate.29 Among other Islam majority population 
countries, Indonesia and Malaysia march toward moderate 
Islam identity. 
It should be noted that one of the most important 
continuities in Indonesian foreign policy is ambition as regional 
power and as a global player.30 The Indonesian foreign policy 
doctrine, free and active (bebas dan aktif) guides the conduct of 
Indonesian foreign policy to find a different way in the world 
(not neutral or align with one of the power bloc) and become 
the subject of its own history not the object of other county.31 
The large size of the country with rich natural resources 
become the factor that push the Indonesian elite to believe that 
Indonesia entitle a prominent role in the world. During 
Soekarno era, free and active was interpreted as an instrument 
to grasp leadership among post-colonial countries as well as a 
tool to manage domestic politics. Under Soeharto reign, 
although foreign policy was mostly influenced by economic 
interest, Indonesia identified itself as the leader of Non-
Alignment Movement and ASEAN. 
The Asian economic crisis that robbed Indonesian 
economic status and the serial terrorism bombing deteriorated 
																																								 																				
28 Daniel Pipes, ‘Identifying Moderate Muslims’, New York Sun, 23 
November 2004. 
29 Steven A. Cook, ‘The Myth of Moderate Islam’, Foreign Policy, June 16, 
2008. 
30 Paige Johnson Tan, ‘Navigating Turbulence Ocean: Indonesia's Worldview 
and Foreign Policy’, Asian Perspective, vol. 31, no. 3, 2007. 
31 This doctrine inspired from the methaphor made by Vice President Hatta 
in the Cold War context, rowing between two reefs. Paige Johnson Tan, ‘Navigating 
Turbulence Ocean: Indonesia's Worldview and Foreign Policy’, p. 151-152. 
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Indonesia’s international image. Indonesia’s status dropped 
dramatically from high performing economic country to pariah 
country, from relatively stable and secure country to the hotbed 
of terrorism. Still under the principle of free and active policy 
with little modification on the metaphor,32 Indonesia under 
Yudhoyono also has a global role ambition. The justification 
now is Indonesia moderate Islam as a model for the rest of the 
world. In the foreign ministry’s 60th anniversary in 2005 
Yudhoyono stated; 
Speaking about changes, people usually faced with three 
options; whether they should be part of the change, 
follow the change or lead the change. Indonesia, God 
willing, surely cannot only be a follower in the changing 
world but, as former President Sukarno and others 
showed us, we should be able to lead on certain issues in 
international relations. This is our ultimate goal...33 
Compare to Malaysia, Indonesia’s identification with 
moderate Islam is a little left behind. Openly declared as Islamic 
country, Malaysia retain its state’s version of Islam against the 
“deviant” around the opposition party (PAS, Islamic Party of 
Malaysia), and outlaw the radical and the militant groups such 
as the KKM (Organisation of Militant Malaysia), one of the 
wing of Jamaah Islamiah. It is obvious however, Malaysia utilised 
the status of moderate Islam as legitimate effort to weaken the 
Islamic political opposition. While the opposition is forced to 
be more radical (than the state’s Islamic version) to appeal the 
people, Malaysia decision to join the war on terrorism and build 
a closer cooperation with the US once again becomes the 
																																								 																				
32 Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s metaphor Navigating Turbulence Ocean is 
seen as a modification of Hatta’s metaphor rowing between two reefs. See, Bantarto 
Bandoro, ‘Navigating turbulent sea’, The Jakarta Post, 1 February 2007. 
33 Ivy Susanti, ‘Indonesia ‘must play leading global role’,The Jakarta Post, 20 
August, 2005. 
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effective rule to demoralize the radical groups by linking them 
to terrorist.34 
Megawati government lukewarm reaction to the war on 
terrorism and lack of action against the radical Muslim groups 
affected the image of Indonesian Islam from international point 
of view. Although Megawati became tougher toward the 
radicals in the post of Bali bombing by issuing the anti-
terrorism law, international community, especially the US still 
perceived that Indonesia has not done maximum efforts to 
diminish the radicals. The US’s view had much to do with the 
Indonesia’s criticism on the US invasion to Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Soon after enacting the new international identity 
Yudhoyono, targeted the US as the first Indonesia’s public 
relations exercise. In the meeting with President George W 
Bush in Bogor Indonesia in 2006, Yudhoyono declined the call 
to immediate withdrawal of US from Iraq. Moreover, 
Yudhoyono offered a “three Rs” formula as the solution of the 
Iraq problem; reconciliation among factions in Iraq, 
replacement the US forces by Muslim-coordinated coalition 
under the UN auspices and reconstruction.35 Whereas President 
Bush stated, “Indonesia is the example of how democracy and 
modernisation can present an alternative to extremism”.36 
Apparently, the US paradigm changed overnight by referring 
Indonesia as the beacon of moderate Muslim democracy, as 
tolerant brand of Muslim as an important ally among Islamic 
population countries. 
The new effort has shown important results. Indonesia 
was elected to a rotating seat on the UN Security Council in 
2006. Moreover Indonesia also began to see the opportunity of 
																																								 																				
34 Amy L. Freedman, ‘Political Viability, Contestation and Power: Islam and 
Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia’, pp. 105-108. 
35 Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia‘President Bush Meets with 
President Yudhoyono of Indonesia’, http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/ina-
usa/statement/persconfbushsby06.htm, downloaded 10 May 2011. 
36 Ann Marie Murphy, ‘Indonesia Return to the International Stage: Good 
News for the United States’, Orbis, winter 2009, p. 74. 
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its identity as a soft power to become an alternative model for 
other Muslim societies as well as a bridge for mutual 
understanding between the Western countries and the Islamic 
world. In several meeting with US secretary state, the British 
Prime Minister, the Dutch Prime Minister and EU high 
representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy in 
2006, Indonesia confidently avowed to play a role in mediating 
the conflict in Middle East.37  
Indonesia then involves in a new role as peacemaker in 
the Islamic world.38 Indonesia records in contributing peace 
efforts in Cambodia, southern Philippines as well as solving 
Muslim separatist in Aceh province become significant 
modalities. In April 2007 Indonesia hosted a gathering of Sunni 
and Shiite clerics and scholars as part to reconcile among 
conflicting factions of Iraq and Iran.39 Furthermore, Indonesia 
has been approached by a number of Western countries and 
also the Israeli government to approach the new Hamas 
government to convince it to moderate its position.40 At his 
visit to Jakarta, President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine also 
urged Indonesia to participate in Annapolis meeting, hosted by 
President Bush in 2007, to discuss Israel-Palestine problems.41 
In addition Indonesia military also joined the UN Peace 
Keeping force in Southern Lebanon in 2006 under the UNIFIL 
(United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mission, as the first 
from Muslim country that involve the mission. 
In seek to a deeper engagement with Islamic countries in 
2006 President Yudhoyono visited five Arab states, Saudi 
																																								 																				
37 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia’, 
pp. 45-46. 
38 Donald Greenlees, ‘Indonesia courts role as peacemakere in the Muslim 
World’, The New York Times, 21 May 2007. 
39 ‘Indonesia Hosts Sunni-Shiite Meeting’, http://www.worldbulletin.net/ 
index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=3095, downloaded 10 May 2011. 
40 ‘Indonesia: Muslim bridge-builder?’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/asia-pacific/7269017.stm, downloaded 10 May 2011. 
41 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia’, 
p. 51. 
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Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UEA and Jordan. In the visitation 
Yudhoyono expected to forge closer economic links between 
the petrodollar countries and Indonesia. At this point there is 
mutual need, on the one hand Indonesia needs alternative 
foreign capital inflow to finance economic development, while 
on the other hand many Arab states also seek for another 
places to invest their capital in the wake of September 11 
terrorist attack that troubled their investment towards Western 
countries.42 
However, Indonesia ability to play peacemaker in Islamic 
World and bridge builder between the West and Islamic world 
constrained by several factors. First, Indonesian role despite of 
the status as the largest Muslim nation still neglected and 
perceived as marginal among Islamic countries. Indonesia also 
so far plays a marginal role in the Organisation of Islamic 
Countries (OIC).43 Moreover many Arab countries maintain to 
underrate Indonesia’s Islamic qualifications as outpost. This 
becomes an explanation on why the Sunni-Shiite conference in 
2006 was not considered as full success since some Iraqi and 
Iranian prominent leaders did not attend.  
Similarly, the Indonesia’s initiative to hold a meeting 
between Hamas and Fatah was delayed twice time until 
uncertain time.44 
Second, the reality that Indonesia does not have 
diplomatic relations with Israel limits its effective role in peace 
																																								 																				
42 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia’, 
p. 50. 
43 Indonesia becomes the member of OIC since its establishment in 1969. 
However Indonesia refused to sign the OIC charter in 1972, since Indonesia never 
declared itself as an Islamic country and tend to see the multilateral forum has been 
dominated by Arabs countries. In the early 1990’s Indonesia started to reactivate its 
involvement in OIC. In post Soeharto era there is a necessity to participate more 
intensively on the OIC. Indonesia will become the host of the next OIC summit in 
2014. See, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, ‘Indonesia's Changing Role in OIC: Is It a 
“Necessity of Foreign Policy?’ Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 1, 2003.  
44  Donald Greenlees, ‘Indonesia courts role as peacemakere in the Muslim 
World’, 
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making process. Indeed, Indonesia’s domestic politics tend to 
see the Palestinian issues as a religious problem per se. For 
Indonesian Muslim population in general, it always becomes the 
test case of how Indonesian foreign policy deals with religious 
solidarity issue among Muslim countries. Formal diplomatic 
engagement with the Israel government is seen to be one 
important step for Indonesia to make a real leverage over Israel. 
45 However, there always strong domestic opposition, mainly 
from the radical groups to any kind of Indonesia recognition or 
effort to make contact with Israeli. 
The ability to promote moderate Islam and democratic 
values also has to face with the domestic pressure that 
demanding a more substantive Islam foreign policy in terms of 
co-religious solidarity. The case of UN sanction on Iranian 
Nuclear Program shows this indication. Indonesia was a non-
permanent member of UNSC when in 2008 to impose second 
resolution 1747 to give sanction on Iran for its non-compliance 
of nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Indonesia’s position was 
support the sanction toward Iran.46 In Indonesia, the Iran 
sanction became an Islamic issue. A big rally for almost three 
days followed by a plethora of community leaders, religious 
groups and politicians that accused Indonesia has betrayed a 
fellow Muslim state. The parliament also insisted the president 
to explain the Indonesia’s support for the UNSC sanction. In 
the third resolution, Indonesia turned the vote into abstaining. 
The entry of Islamic voices into foreign policy has been 
expected to articulate a greater demand for Indonesia to 
																																								 																				
45 Greg Barton & Collin Rubenstein, ‘Indonesia and Israel: A Relationship In 
Waiting’, Jewish Political Studies Review, vol. 17, no.1, 2005. 
46 The resolution to give sanction towards Iran was held three times. The 
first voting in 2006 resulted 14-1, with objection from Qatar. The second voting in 
2008 resulted 15-0, and the voting for the third sanction resulted 14-0 and 1 
abstaining from Indonesia. ‘UN Votes for new sanction against Iran’ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2008/mar/03/iran.unitednations, downloaded 
10 May 2011.  Also Bantarto Bandoro, ‘Indonesia and Iran's persistent resistance’, 
The Jakarta Post, 11 March 2008. 
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support the Islamic world. The case of Iran demonstrated that 
there always a dilemma in the relation between Islam and the 
conduct of Indonesian foreign policy, whether it should be 
based on co-religious solidarity to maintain domestic support or 
to sort out friends and enemies in fostering cooperation in 
serving a much bigger national interest. 
 
Conclusion: Further Challenges 
As this essay has shown, the Indonesia’s new 
international identity is influenced by the dynamic change in 
domestic politics and the shifting of international environment 
in the post September 11. Since political Islam increasingly 
plays a significant role in Indonesia’s democracy, it is imperative 
to formulate a middle way by which Islam could be 
incorporated into Indonesia’s foreign policy. So far, the 
moderate Islam has become an effective instrument in the 
struggle to mainstreaming moderate view in domestic politics as 
well as improving the image of the country. 
The next challenging tasks, however is to prove the claim 
as an alternative model of Islamic society and as a bridge 
between the Western countries and the Islamic world. Such 
challenges require not only maintaining the democratic system 
but also need to demonstrate the viability of Islamic values-
democracy nexus in transforming its society into a tolerant, 
pluralist, modern and anti-violence. Moreover, the new identity  
project and the bigger engagement in Islamic affairs has to be 
conducted carefully to keep away from causing tension at home 
and in relations between other Islamic countries. It needs a 
comprehensive conceptual framework to define what kind of 
Islamic influence that wants to be projected in foreign policy 
otherwise it will turn to be a radical Islam blowback. 
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